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Abstract—Currently, the Republic of Kazakhstan is developing 
a new standard for symmetric data encryption. One of the 
candidates for the role of the standard is the Qamal encryption 
algorithm developed by the Institute of Information and 
Computer Technologies (Almaty, Republic of Kazakhstan). The 
article describes the algorithm. Differential properties of the main 
operations that make up the Qamal cypher are considered in the 
questions of stability. We have shown that for a version with a 
128-bit data block and the same secret key size for three rounds 
of encryption it is difficult to find the right pairs of texts with a 
probability of 2–120, which makes differential cryptanalysis not 
applicable to the Qamal cypher. 
 
Keywords—cryptography, block cypher, difference, differential 
cryptanalysis, probability 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE first of the well-known government standards for data 
encryption was the DES standard adopted in the United 
States in the early 1970s. It was the time when the first 
computers (electronic computers) gradually ceased to be exotic 
and began to enter the life and work of small firms and 
research laboratories. This led to the fact that the problem of 
data protection, stored and processed on them, was recognized 
by a growing number of specialists. Many large corporations, 
not to mention public services, have conducted their own 
research in this area. As a result, various encryption algorithms 
began to appear. One of the most famous research centres of 
this kind at that time was the IBM science laboratory, headed 
by Dr Horst Feistel [1]. As a result, a system of encryption 
called Lucifer was created. For this encryption system, Horst 
Feistel proposed a mathematical model, which is now called 
the "Feistel scheme". The principle of the Feistel scheme is 
that only half or part of the text is encrypted in one round. A 
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block of text is divided into parts. One part goes through some 
mathematical transformation. And the result of this 
transformation is added up by modulo two with the second part 
of the text. After that, the parts of the text are swapped. 
Another advantage of the scheme was the fact that by using the 
“Exclusive-OR” operation or, as it is also called the modulo-
two addition operation, it becomes possible to use the same 
scheme for both data encryption and data decryption, it is 
enough just to change the order of the round subkeys. Initially, 
the DES standard was adopted for a period of 5 years, but later 
it was repeatedly extended as a standard [2]. By the end of the 
20th century, computers were already widespread and 
computing power increased significantly. Therefore, the U.S. 
government has thought about changing the standard. As a 
result, a tender was announced for the adoption of a new data 
encryption standard – the AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard) competition. The competition was announced in 
1997 by the National Institute of Standards and Technologies 
(NIST) [3]. Fifteen encryption algorithms created by scientists 
from different countries were announced for participation in 
the contest. As a result of a five-year study, the Rijndael 
encryption algorithm developed by two mathematicians from 
Belgium, Vincent Rijmen (V. Rijmen) and Joan Damen, was 
chosen as the new US standard. The Rijndael algorithm is built 
on a network scheme based on substitutions and permutations 
(SPN) and has the architecture of "Square". At that time, the 
"Square" architecture and the SP-network were an innovative 
solution. Now many algorithms are AES-like and follow the 
structure of the Rijndael cypher. 
In parallel with the AES competition in January 2000, a very 
similar competition began in Europe, involving the selection of 
cryptographic standards of the European Union. This 
competition was called NESSIE (New European Schemes for 
Signature, Integrity and Encryption) [3]. As a result of the 
work on the NESSIE competition, a great work entitled 
"NESSIE security report" [3] was written by scientists-
cryptographers, but the European standard was never chosen. 
Under the influence of the US and European sentiment, the 
CRYPTREC project was created in Japan. CRYPTREC is an 
acronym from the Cryptography Research and Evaluation 
Committee [4]. The project was created to study cryptographic 
algorithms and then recommend specific algorithms for use in 
public and private organizations. As a result of the 
CRYPTREC project, a number of recommended encryption 
algorithms have been identified. CIPHERUNICORN-E, 
Hierocrypt-L1, MISTY1 and a three-key version of the Triple 
DES algorithm were recommended for 64-bit ciphers. For 128-
bit: AES, Camellia, CIPHERUNICORN-A, Hierocrypt-3, 
SC2000. 
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In Russia, the standard of symmetric encryption GOST 
28147-89 was adopted in 1989. However, until 1994 it 
remained classified. GOST 28147-89 is a 64-bit block cipher 
built according to the Feistel scheme. Developers have put in 
the cipher excessive resistance due to a large number of rounds 
of encryption (32 rounds) and the imposition of a secret key 
using the operation of addition on modulo 232. On January 1, 
2016, a new data encryption standard was adopted in Russia – 
GOST R34.12-2015 [6]. The new encryption standard includes 
two encryption algorithms: Magma and Kuznechik. Magma is 
a former GOST 28147-89 standard with one exception. In the 
GOST 28147-89 standard, S-blocks were not fixed and could 
be selected randomly. In the Magma S-blocks algorithm are 
regulated by the standard. Kuznechik algorithm is a 128-bit 
symmetric block cipher, built on the principle of SP-network. 
The states that used to make up the USSR inherited the 
GOST 28147-89 standard of encryption. At the moment, there 
is a tendency for these countries to develop their own national 
security systems, which, among other things, include the 
development of their own data encryption standards. Thus, in 
Belarus, the STB 34.101.31-2007 standard “Information 
technologies and security. Cryptographic encryption and 
integrity control algorithms” was developed [7]. First, in 2007, 
the standard STB 34.101.31-2007 was adopted as a 
preliminary standard. In 2011, STB 34.101.31-2007 was 
enacted as the final standard. In July 2015, the symmetric 
encryption standard was adopted in Ukraine [8]. Standard 
DSTU 7624: 2014 describes the operation of Kalina 
encryption algorithm, which is an AES-like encryption 
algorithm. 
The Republic of Kazakhstan is also currently working on the 
creation of a state standard for symmetric data encryption 
within the framework of the project "Development of software 
and hardware for cryptographic protection of information 
during its transmission and storage in info-communication 
systems and general-purpose networks" from the Committee of 
Science of the Ministry of Education and Science of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan [9]. One of the design algorithms of 
encryption is the Qamal cipher, proposed for research in this 
paper. In the first part of the work (chapter II) we describe the 
Qamal project cipher and provide examples of the 
implementation of the basic cipher transformations that can be 
used as control points when performing a software cipher 
implementation. The following part (chapter III) is dedicated 
to the discussion of differential properties of all the basic 
operations that are part of the Qamal algorithm. Next chapter 
describes the technology of building multi-round 
characteristics and evaluates the stability of the Qamal cipher 
according to the differential cryptanalysis methods. 
II. QAMAL ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM 
A. Data encryption using Qamal's encryption algorithm 
The Qamal encryption algorithm is a symmetrical block 
encryption algorithm, built on the principle of SP-network. 
The algorithm supports block and key lengths of 128, 192 and 
256 bits, while the length of the processed block of data and 
the length of the secret key must always match. The number of 
encryption rounds depends on the length of the block and the 
key. The 128, 192 and 256 bit K keys correspond to eight, ten 
and twelve rounds of encryption, respectively. All rounds 
except the last are identical. In the last round, an additional 
round key is added. The scheme of the encryption algorithm is 
shown in Figure 1 [10]. 
The encryption algorithm includes developed key imposition 
procedures using the bitwise addition (XOR) operation, the S-
block replacement, the mixing procedures Mixer1 and Mixer2. 
In the first procedure, a key modulo 2 operation (XOR 
operation) is performed on the block of plaintext. 
The second procedure is to replace the bytes using the S-box 
replacement. For this, a nonlinear conversion of bytes is 
performed: a nonlinear bijective substitution is applied to each 
byte. The resulting S-box is presented in Table I. In Table I, all 
data is given in hexadecimal. Using an S-block is similar to 
using an S-block for the AES data encryption standard: the 
original byte is divided into two halves, the top 4 bits (left side 
of the byte) indicate the row number in the replacement table, 
and the bottom 4 bits (right side of the byte) indicate the 




Fig.1. Qamal Encryption Algorithm Scheme 
TABLE I 
S1-BLOCK 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 C9 34 F0 18 55 86 21 6B 87 D2 6E 99 BD 31 98 89 
1 29 73 83 8B 1A 19 E1 E4 F3 5B 72 3F A6 F9 2E A3 
2 7E 10 94 07 EC AD 2F 26 20 93 66 3D DD 64 5F C1 
3 13 E0 80 25 D3 08 75 6A B9 2D D1 CC FD CA 3B FC 
4 D5 DA E2 CE A0 7F AE C8 9C 09 3C 95 BA 35 3E 7B 
5 FA 8D 23 AB D9 E8 74 2A C3 A8 D8 52 45 B5 0A 0C 
6 A4 61 9A FB AA F6 78 84 C4 E9 EE 54 50 81 DF 90 
7 36 B4 BB 44 C5 96 4B 28 14 E6 8F FF B0 1F 53 47 
8 00 4C 40 2C 9B 9F 4A 01 7D AF 92 56 7A DB 8E 16 
9 63 24 A9 1D 33 4D E7 1C 70 69 B7 C6 32 E5 57 03 
A 97 A5 EB D4 BC 5D F8 85 06 F2 59 F4 17 22 38 DC 
B 0B FE BE CD 41 82 04 0E 48 71 30 AC EF C7 2B CB 
C B8 8C 5A 42 A7 4E D0 46 BF B3 91 E3 11 7C 6F DE 
D 88 58 1E 5C 9D 60 C0 62 05 79 ED 76 C2 02 65 D7 
E F1 8A 77 F7 37 B1 0F 67 CF 0D A1 6C 4F 3A 39 1B 
F 27 B6 5E F5 EA 6D 15 9E B2 12 A2 68 43 51 49 D6 
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The third procedure is the linear formation of the Mixer1 
block. Bytes of the block are represented in the form of a two-
dimensional array A with the size m*4, where m takes on the 
value of 4, 6 or 8, depending on the size of the initial block: 
 𝐀 = [
𝑎00 𝑎01 𝑎02 𝑎03
𝑎10 𝑎10 𝑎10 𝑎10
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑎𝑚0 𝑎𝑚1 𝑎𝑚2 𝑎𝑚3
].  
Bytes of each column are added together modulo 256: 
 M1(bij) = ∑ aij
m
i=0 mod 256, j = 0,1,2,3. 
Then, the obtained new byte of the first column is placed in a 
place of the upper byte a00, and the original bytes are shifted 
down by one position. This operation is repeated four times. 
As a result, we get four new bytes in the first column. Further, 




Fig. 2. Operation of the Mixer1 
The formation of the Mixer1 block results in a new B array 
of m*4 size, where m will be equal to 4, 6 or 8 depending on 
the block size (respectively m=4 for a block of 128 bits, m=6 
for a block of 192 bits and m=8 for a block of 256 bits): 
 B = [
𝑏00 𝑏01 𝑏02 𝑏03
𝑏10 𝑏10 𝑏10 𝑏10
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
𝑏𝑚0 𝑏𝑚1 𝑏𝑚2 𝑏𝑚3
].  
Each row of the array is represented as a polynomial and a 
polynomial multiplication of the form bi(x) * mi(x) mod p(x) 
occurs, where:  
p = 1000000000000000000000001001101112 = 0x100000137; 
m0= 101010000010001010111011101110102 = 0xA822BBBA; 
m1 = 110100100011010111010010011001012 = 0xD235D265; 
m2= 110110100001100110010110110100102 = 0xDA1996D2; 
m3 = 100100000100101110011110000110112 = 0x904B9E1B; 
m4 = 101000110000010001101111011010102 = 0xA3046F6A; 
m5 =100101101110110100001101001101012 = 0x96ED0D35; 
m6= 011000110011101101101000110011012 = 0x633B68CD; 
m7 =101001110011000111110001100110102 = 0xA731F19A. 
The mi(x) values are also presented as polynomials and are 
applied as follows. With an open block length of 128 bits, the 
first four values of m0(x), m1(x), m2(x), m3(x) are used. For the 
block length of 192 bits the first 6 six values of m0(x), m1(x), 
m2(x), m3(x), m4(x), m5(x) are taken. For the third possible 
block length, all eight mi(x) values are used [10]. 
B. Data decryption using Qamal's encryption algorithm 
To decrypt the ciphertext, all cryptographic transformations 
used for encryption are inverted and used in the decryption 
algorithm in reverse order. Round keys are also used in reverse 
order. When decrypting each of these block lengths, 8, 10, or 
12 rounds are performed, respectively, with InvS, InvM1, and 
InvM2 inverse conversions performed in each block length. 
The InvS conversion is inverse to the byte change operation 
through S-block using Table I. For example, if byte 00 was 
replaced by byte C9, byte C9 must be replaced by byte 00 for 




 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 80 87 DD 9F B6 D8 A8 23 35 49 5E B0 5F E9 B7 E6 
1 21 CC F9 30 78 F6 8F AC 03 15 14 EF 97 93 D2 7D 
2 28 06 AD 52 91 33 27 F0 77 10 57 BE 83 39 1E 26 
3 BA 0D 9C 94 01 4D 70 E4 AE EE ED 3E 4A 2B 4E 1B 
4 82 B4 C3 FC 73 5C C7 7F B8 FE 86 76 81 95 C5 EC 
5 6C FD 5B 7E 6B 04 8B 9E D1 AA C2 19 D3 A5 F2 2E 
6 D5 61 D7 90 2D DE 2A E7 FB 99 37 07 EB F5 0A CE 
7 98 B9 1A 11 56 36 DB E2 66 D9 8C 4F CD 88 20 45 
8 32 6D B5 12 67 A7 05 08 D0 0F E1 13 C1 51 8E 7A 
9 6F CA 8A 29 22 4B 75 A0 0E 0B 62 84 48 D4 F7 85 
A 44 EA FA 1F 60 A1 1C C4 59 92 64 53 BB 25 46 89 
B 7C E5 F8 C9 71 5D F1 9A C0 38 4C 72 A4 0C B2 C8 
C D6 2F DC 58 68 74 9B BD 47 00 3D BF 3B B3 43 E8 
D C6 3A 09 34 A3 40 FF DF 5A 54 41 8D AF 2C CF 6E 
E 31 16 42 CB 17 9D 79 96 55 69 F4 A2 24 DA 6A BC 
F 02 E0 A9 18 AB F3 65 E3 A6 1D 50 63 3F 3C B1 7B 
 
The InvM1 transform is the reverse of the Mixer1 transform. 
This means that the addition operation modulo 256 must be 
replaced by a sequential subtraction operation modulo 256. 
The conversion of InvM2 is inverse to the procedure for 
obtaining a Mixer2 block. To obtain a block inverse Mixer2, 
each row of the array is treated as a polynomial, which is 
multiplied by fixed polynomials modulo p(x), where: 
 
m0–1= 11110011 01001000 10001001 110101012 = 0xf3488ad5; 
m1–1= 00010110 01110011 11010000 110101112 = 0x1673d0d7; 
m2–1= 10001010 00101110 10001011 101110102 = 0x8a2e8bba; 
m3–1 =11000000 10100010 00111100 101100002 = 0xc0a23cb0; 
m4–1= 11111101 10100101 01100100 010100102 = 0xfda56452; 
m5–1= 01111111 10011100 00110000 001000102 = 0x7f9c3022; 
m6–1= 10011000 01001011 10011101 001111102 = 0x984b9d3e; 
m7–1= 00011110 01110011 00011111 100010002 = 0x1e731f88; 
 
The first four values m0–1(x), m1–1(x), m2–1(x), m3–1(x) are 
used for an open block of 128 bits. For the block length of 192 
bits the first six values of m0–1(x), m1–1(x), m2–1(x), m3–1(x),  
m4–1(x), m5–1(x) are taken. For the third possible block length, 
all eight mi–1(x) values are used [10]. 
C. Round key generation algorithm 
Round keys Ki are generated from the cipher key K using the 
key expansion procedure. As a result, an array of round keys is 
formed, from which the necessary round key is then directly 
selected. The scheme for obtaining round keys is shown in 
Figure 3. 
The original secret key K is the first round subkey. To 
generate the following secret key, ten rounds of conversions 
are performed: the replacement with the S-box shown in Table 
III, the transformation Mixer1 (Figure 2) and the 
transformation Mixer2, which is similar to the transformation 
of the same name in the encryption procedure. 
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The last procedure of the round is called Module pi(x) and 
works as follows. Let 𝑔1(𝑥), 𝑔2(𝑥), … , 𝑔𝑆(𝑥) – irreducible 
binary polynomials used as working bases, where 𝐺(𝑥) =
𝑔1(𝑥)𝑔2(𝑥) … 𝑔𝑆(𝑥). The degree of the polynomial 𝐺(𝑥)  
corresponds to the value 𝑁 = 𝑚1 + 𝑚2 + ⋯ + 𝑚𝑆  and is 
equal to the block length (i.e.128, 192, 256). The output from 
the Mixer2 block is represented as an N(x) polynomial with 
binary coefficients. k1(x), k2(x), ..., ks(x) – the remains of the 
division of the polynomial N(х) on the corresponding bases 
pi(x), i = 1,...,s.  Where pi(x), i = 1,...,s are the secret elements 




Fig. 3. Round key Ki expansion, where i=0,1,…,8 [9,13] 
TABLE III. 
S2-BLOCK, USED FOR ROUND KEY FORMATION 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 
0 55 A8 78 9C C3 ED B1 DE CD 2C 09 51 27 2D 43 C2 
1 CA 45 3A CE 7B 79 84 7D BF E6 69 1F 5E CB 9E E2 
2 49 38 8E 7C 31 DF 98 42 91 57 90 A6 BD F1 41 AC 
3 20 96 8C C7 4B BE 70 E9 D0 4D 1A A1 B0 DA 5D D3 
4 88 B5 30 47 6B 35 12 B2 B4 17 10 A2 60 9B 0D FD 
5 E4 C6 54 EB B7 B9 7F AF 21 5C D4 99 5F 3E A9 F3 
6 3C C0 67 13 6A 2F 1C 29 89 58 73 EC 14 39 D8 4E 
7 44 02 59 23 F2 0C FC AB 74 87 92 36 82 04 16 0E 
8 BB 01 F6 15 E7 DC 8F 07 4A FF 65 1B 25 8B 75 D7 
9 A5 7A A7 FA 24 E5 AE 61 CF 9D 32 66 AA 05 D2 62 
A 8D C4 4F 26 06 0A D9 7E F7 E3 F0 34 40 0F FB 1E 
B 6F A3 D1 BA 95 3D 33 71 83 18 E0 CC 2B A0 D5 28 
C E1 64 9F 97 4C A4 76 B3 19 08 68 C1 22 1D B8 8A 
D E8 50 00 C9 46 56 5A 72 F5 3B 63 94 93 9A 0B AD 
E DD C8 FE 5B 53 85 6E EE 86 80 F9 52 81 11 2A 48 
F C5 EA EF DB B6 3F 37 77 6D 03 2E D6 F4 BC F8 6C 
 
The values of the polynomials p(x) for the Module operation 
are secret, that is, in fact, they actually make up additional key 
information. For the purposes of this paper, we will use the 
following polynomial values as a secret element ( )ip x  to 
obtain round keys: 
 
p1(x)=100000000001010112 = 0x1002B; 
p2(x)=100000000001011012 = 0x1002D; 
p3(x)=100000000001110012 = 0x10039; 
p4(x)=100000000001111112 = 0x1003F; 
p5(x)=100000000010001112 = 0x10047; 
p6(x)=100000000010100112 = 0x10053; 
p7(x)=100000000100011012 = 0x1008D; 
p8(x)=100000000101111012 = 0x100BD; 
After ten rounds of transformations, the result is added 
modulo two with the value of the round subkey from which the 
current subkey was generated, resulting in a new round key. 
To get the next round key, you need to re-run a cycle of ten 
transformations [10]. 
III. DIFFERENTIAL PROPERTIES OF THE BASIC QAMAL CIPHER 
TRANSFORMATIONS 
A. Main stages of differential analysis 
Before proceeding to the differential analysis of the Qamal 
encryption algorithm, it is necessary to consider the differential 
properties of each of its operations separately. A detailed 
description of the method of differential analysis can be found 
in [12 – 14]. Note that there are four main stages of using the 
method of differential analysis. 
Stage 1. Analysis of the differential properties of all 
conversion components in the encryption algorithm. 
Stage 2. Search for the most likely value of the differential, 
that is, such a pair of input difference – output difference, the 
appearance of which is most likely. 
Stage 3. Search for the right pairs of texts. That is, such texts 
for which the sum modulo two at the input to the encryption 
algorithm coincides with the input difference, and the sum of 
the values at the output of the encryption algorithm coincides 
with the output difference. 
Stage 4. Analysis of the correct pairs of texts in order to 
determine the bits of the secret key. 
The main difficulty of differential cryptanalysis lies in the 
difficulty of finding the correct pairs of texts, which in turn 
depends directly on the value of the probability of the 
considered differential. That is why finding the differential that 
has the highest probability is of primary importance. Knowing 
the difference in the most probable differential, we can predict 
how successful the analysis of the cipher itself, or its reduced 
version will be. This means determining the number of cipher 
rounds for which differential cryptanalysis is still possible. 
B. Differential properties of the addition operation modulo 2 
In differential cryptanalysis, the texts being transformed are 
considered not separately, but jointly. To be more precise, their 
difference is considered, which is defined as a result of the 
addition module two of these texts: ΔХ = Х X1. 
In this case, the difference value ΔX will contain zeros in 
those positions in which the original messages were equal and 
«1» where the bits differed. 
It is known that the operation of adding data with the secret 
key does not affect the change of the difference between the 
texts. This is due to the fact that the same secret encryption key 
is used for encryption. Thus, the texts will be added up with 
the same K value, which in turn will form a value equal to zero 
when stacked together: ΔХ = Х KiX1Ki = =ХX1. 
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C. Differential properties of bit change operation with S-block 
Since the S-block of the cipher changes 8 bits to 8 bits, the 
possible range of input differences coincides with the range of 
output differences and is in the range from 0 to 255. We have 
constructed a table of the dependence of output differences ΔC 
of the S-block on the value of input difference ΔA and 
revealed the following properties: 
Property 1. The value ΔC = 0 at the output of the 
transformation can be obtained only in the case when ΔA = 0. 
In this case, the probability of the appearance of the difference 
at the output is 1. 
Property 2. In the constructed analysis table, the maximum 
probability value is 6/256 = 3/128. 
Property 3. There are values of input differences ΔA, which 
remain unchanged after passing through the S-block. These 
are, for example, values (in decimal form) such as ΔA = 2, 3, 
4, 6, 15, 16, 17, 18 and others. 
Property 4. The value of the input difference ΔA = 254 
(ΔA = 0xFE) is converted to the value of the difference 
ΔC = 128 (ΔC = 0x80) with the probability p = 4/256 = 1/64. 
D. Differential properties of the transformation Mixer1 
Although the fact that the Mixer1 transformation is a linear 
transformation, it is necessary to determine how the different 
values change when applying the addition modulo 256. It is 
known that when performing the addition modulo 2n, the 
difference remains unchanged with probability p = 1 only if 
the input difference contains only one nonzero bit in the most 
significant bit. Thus, if the value of the difference equal to 
0x80 is used in the Mixer1 transform, then whatever 
transformations we make with it, the probability will always 
remain equal to 1. The Mixer1 transformation depends on four 
bytes of one column. Therefore, it is important to consider how 
the output values will change. In this case, from the point of 
view of differential cryptanalysis, we are interested in those 
variants that affect the least number of active bytes. Since in 
the Mixer1 operation, addition is performed modulo 256, the 
0x80 difference value will always remain the same. So, the 
addition of two identical differences 0x80 and 0x80 modulo 
256 (0x100) will lead to zero. Thus, we can consider 15 
options for populating the source column of the Mixer1 
transformation, where the byte values can only be 0x00 or 




THE RESULT OF THE DIFFERENCE CONVERSION IN THE MIXER1 











0х80 0х80 0 0 0 
0 0х80 0х80 0 0 
0 0 0х80 0х80 0 
0 0 0 0х80 0х80 
 
E. Differential properties of the transformation Mixer1 
The Mixer2 conversion is a linear conversion. It has no effect 
on the change in the probability of the difference 
transformation. However, in order to build multi-round 
characteristics, it is important to determine exactly how the 
value of strings containing the value of 0x80 in one of the 
bytes that will be obtained after the Mixer1 conversion will be 
converted. It is important to remember that each string uses its 
own polynomial m for multiplication. Each line contains 4 
bytes. If to consider that each byte can contain the value of 
difference equal 0, or value of a difference equal 0х80 it turns 
out all 15 possible fillings for each line from 0х0000000080 to 
0х80808080. Let's consider how these differences will be 
transformed with the use of polynomials m (for the block 
version of 128 bits a total of 60 variants are obtained: 15 
variants of filling and 4 polynomials m). We are interested in 
cases when bytes at the output of the Mixer 2 transformation, 
after passing through the replacement S-block, can be 
converted to 0x80 values. That is, in the table of dependences 
ΔA and ΔC at the intersection of ΔA formed from the byte of 
the conversion output Mixer2 and ΔC=0x80, there must be a 
value different from 0. We have developed a program with the 
help of which we have calculated all possible variants. 
As a result of using this program, it was found that only one 
of the 60 considered combinations satisfies the given 
condition. The input difference equal to 0x80808000 is 
converted to the difference 0xBBC868CF and after passing 
through the S-block of replacement can be converted to the 
difference value 0x80808080. Exactly this combination we 
will use in the future to build multi-round characteristics. 
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF MULTI-ROUND CHARACTERISTICS 
Based on the differential properties of the main Qamal cipher 
operations, let's build a multi-round characteristic and 
determine its probability. Our task is to construct the 
characteristic in such a way that as few active S-blocks as 
possible are affected. This directly affects the probability of 
finding the right pair of texts for a given characteristic. Our 
task is to determine how many Qamal rounds can be analyzed 
faster than using the full brute force method. A 128-bit block 
of data uses a 128-bit secret key, which means that the 
complexity of a full brute force attack is 2128. 
 
TABLE V. 
DIFFERENCE CONVERSION FOR THE FIRST ROUND OF QAMAL CIPHER 
First round input 
0xFE 0xFE 0xFE 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0xFE 0xFE 0xFE 0 
Mixer 1 transformation input 
0x80 0x80 0x80 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0x80 0x80 0x80 0 
Mixer 2 transformation input 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0x80 0x80 0x80 0 
0 0 0 0 
 
Consider the first round of encryption. We omit the addition 
operation with the round subkey since it does not affect the 
change in the difference of texts. We need the value 0x80 
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bytes to appear at the input of the Mixer1 transformation. In 
accordance with property 4 of section 4.3, the value 0хfe will 
be converted to the value 0х80 with a probability of 4/256 = 
1/64 = 2–6. At the same time, we should form the input of the 
first round in such a way that after the Mixer1 transformation 
the non-zero difference is in the third line of the state array. If 
the input difference affects the first and fourth bytes for the 
first three state columns, then after the replacement S-boxes, 
all non-zero bytes are converted to 0x80 bytes with a 
probability (2–6) 6 = 2–36. It can be seen that already from the 
first round of encryption the probability of obtaining a round 
characteristic is rather small. The Mixer1 transformation will 
change the state array without affecting the overall probability. 
As a result, nonzero bytes will appear only in the first three 
positions of the third row. All other values will be zero. The 
conversion scheme for the first round is presented in detail in 
table V. 
In section 2.5 it was shown that if the input of the third line 
in the Mixer2 transformation is 0x80808000, the output will be 
0xBBC868CF. Each byte of the difference 0xBBC868CF can 
be converted to the byte 0x80. The probability that all four 
bytes will be converted to 0x80 values is (2–7)4 = 2–28. Thus, 
the final probability for two rounds of encryption is 2–64. After 
the Mixer1 function, the second and fourth lines will be filled 
with 0x80 bytes, as shown in Table VI.  
 
TABLE VI. 
 DIFFERENCE CONVERSION FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF QAMAL CIPHER 
S-block input 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0xBB 0xC8 0x68 0xCF 
0 0 0 0 
Mixer 1 transformation input 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0x80 0x80 0x80 0x80 
0 0 0 0 
Mixer 2 transformation input 
0 0 0 0 
0x80 0x80 0x80 0x80 
0 0 0 0 
0x80 0x80 0x80 0x80 
 
As a result of the analysis of the differential properties of the 
Mixer2 transformation, it was found that for the second and 
fourth lines the input difference 0x80808080 cannot be 
converted so that in the next round after the S-transformation 
all the difference bytes are equal to 0x80. Therefore, we have 
considered other options for conversions. The second and 
fourth status lines, containing the difference value 
0x95D14821, obtained after the Mixer2 transformation, will be 
input of the S-block of the third round (table VII). In 
accordance with the table of differential properties, we 
determined that byte 0x95 can be replaced by byte 0x80. For 
the remaining bytes, a replacement option has been selected 
that will affect three non-zero bytes of the column (out of four) 
after the Mixer1 conversion. The 0xD1 byte, according to the 
analysis table, has a chance to be converted to 0x40 byte and 
0xC0 byte. In this case, the Mixer1 transformation will be 
performed according to Table VIII. 0x48 and 0x21 bytes 
cannot be converted in the same way as 0xD1 bytes, so it was 
found that they can be converted to 0x10 and 0xF0 bytes, in 
which case the Mixer1 transformation will be performed 
according to Table IX. 
The conversion probability of each byte on the S-block 
replacement for the third round is 2–7. A total of 8 non-zero 
blocks are used in the third round. Thus, the probability of 
conversion in the third round is (2–7)8 = 2–56. It turns out that 
the probability for three rounds of cipher will be 2–120, which is 
very close to the value of the probability of a complete search. 
Therefore, it makes no sense to consider the transformation of 
the difference further. We need to determine the value of the 
difference at the output of the third round of encryption. To do 
this, let's consider the difference at the input to the Mixer2 
transform of the third round (Table VII). Applying the Mixer1 
and Mixer2 transformations to it, we obtain the state of 
differences as shown in Table X. 
 
TABLE VII. 
DIFFERENCE CONVERSION FOR THE THIRD ROUND OF QAMAL CIPHER 
S-block input 
0 0 0 0 
0x95 0xD1 0x48 0x21 
0 0 0 0 
0x95 0xD1 0x48 0x21 
Mixer 1 transformation input 
0 0 0 0 
0x80 0х40 0x10 0x10 
0 0 0 0 
0x80 0xC0 0x1F 0x1F 
Mixer 2 transformation input 
0x80 0xc0 0x30 0x30 
0 0x80 0x20 0x20 
0x80 0x40 0x10 0x10 
0 0 0 0 
 
TABLE VIII. 











0x00 0x00 0x40 0x80 0xC0 
0x40 0x00 0x00 0x40 0x80 
0x00 0x40 0x00 0x00 0x40 
0xC0 0x00 0x40 0x00 0x00 
 
TABLE IX. 











0x00 0x00 0x10 0x20 0x30 
0x10 0x00 0x00 0x10 0x20 
0x00 0x10 0x00 0x00 0x10 
0xF0 0x00 0x10 0x00 0x00 
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TABLE X.  
THE STATE OF DIFFERENCES AFTER THE THIRD ROUND OF ENCRYPTION 
0x4C 0x6B 0x94 0xEA 
0xAD 0xDE 0x47 0x5B 
0xE1 0xB2 0xD3 0xB1 
0х00 0х00 0х00 0х00 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We have considered the project algorithm of symmetric 
Qamal encryption, which is considered as a candidate for the 
standard of data encryption in the Republic of Kazakhstan. We 
have shown that for a version with a 128-bit data block and a 
secret key of the same length, differential cryptanalysis 
becomes inapplicable after three rounds of encryption. The 
encryption has yet to be thoroughly tested using other 
cryptoanalytic attacks to fully verify its reliability. 
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